Turkish competition law newsletter - Issue 2026/4

Introduction

As 2026 draws towards its close, Turkish competition law continues to evolve through decisions that are increasingly significant not only for their outcomes, but also for the approaches the Turkish Competition Authority (the “Authority”) adopts in addressing competitive concerns. This Autumn 2026 edition of the Paksoy Turkish Competition Law Newsletter covers nine developments spanning merger control, information exchange, labour markets, pharmaceutical regulation, cartel facilitation, on-site inspections and exclusionary practices in retail markets. Across these areas, two themes stand out: the Turkish Competition Board’s (the “Board”) growing willingness to design remedies tailored to the specific competitive concerns identified, and the increasing importance of evidentiary standards and procedural safeguards in determining the boundaries of enforcement.

We open with Azimut’s proposed acquisition of Yapı Kredi Portföy and the accompanying long-term distribution partnership with Yapı Kredi. The Board granted unconditional merger clearance for the acquisition and an individual exemption covering the full 15-year distribution arrangement. The latter is particularly noteworthy as the first individual exemption granted for an arrangement of this nature in Türkiye’s portfolio management industry.

Labour markets feature prominently in this issue, with an investigation encompassing 26 undertakings across the banking, insurance and information technology sectors. Three banks, Akbank, Garanti BBVA and QNB, have disclosed settlements resulting in aggregate administrative fines exceeding TRY 4 billion, whilst the outcomes concerning the remaining undertakings have not yet been established on the basis of publicly available information. The scale of these sanctions highlights the increasing financial exposure associated with labour market infringements.

From enforcement to sector-wide policy, we examine the Authority’s Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report (the “Preliminary Report”), published in August 2026, and the subsequent workshop held in September. The Preliminary Report addresses competition concerns throughout the pharmaceutical value chain, including patent strategies capable of delaying generic entry, product hopping, reimbursement mechanisms and exclusive distribution arrangements. Particularly noteworthy is the proposed reassessment of exclusivity in public pharmaceutical procurement, where the Authority has suggested a shared exclusivity model to strengthen competition between wholesalers supplying the same medicine. The workshop further highlighted the difficult balance between preserving incentives for pharmaceutical innovation, facilitating generic entry and ensuring sustainable access to medicines. Whilst the proposals remain subject to further consultation and do not themselves establish new obligations, they provide an important indication of the Authority’s policy priorities and areas likely to attract closer scrutiny.

Turning to retail markets, we examine the Board’s interim measure against Adkoturk, which adds a further dimension to the Authority’s developing approach to protecting competitors’ access to retail space. Unlike the Frito Lay, Unilever/Magnum, Coca-Cola and Haribo decisions, which we examined in our Summer edition and which involved mandatory allocation of shelf or cooler space to competing products, the Adkoturk measure restricts the commercial incentives suspected of securing exclusionary shelf arrangements. The Board prohibited certain benefits offered to retailers, including free products, delisting budgets and visibility support, pending its final decision. Rather than prescribing how retail space must be shared, the Board has intervened in the commercial arrangements that may determine which products reach consumers in the first place. The decision also reinforces the growing importance of interim measures as a means of addressing potential competitive harm before an investigation is concluded.

In terms of cartel enforcement, the Aydın ready-mixed concrete decision develops the Board’s approach to cartel facilitator liability. The Board found that Çimentaş, a cement producer that did not compete in the ready-mixed concrete market, had facilitated a customer allocation arrangement among downstream producers. The decision examines the requirements for establishing facilitator liability, including knowledge of, or the ability to foresee, the cartel’s existence, actual contribution to its objectives and the intention to support those objectives. The Board’s treatment of evidence concerning undertakings for which no infringement was established is equally important. The decision illustrates both the potential reach of cartel liability beyond the immediate participants in an anti-competitive agreement and the importance of assessing the evidentiary basis for each undertaking’s alleged involvement.

As for information exchange, the Board’s dairy sector decision offers an instructive examination of the evidence required to establish anti-competitive coordination through supplier-retailer relationships. The investigation concerned allegations that competing retailers and dairy suppliers had exchanged commercially sensitive pricing information, potentially through indirect information flows. Despite the presence of documents containing competitors’ prices and certain economic findings consistent with the allegations, the Board ultimately found no infringement. The decision carefully assesses documentary and economic evidence, demonstrating that the existence of potentially sensitive information does not, without sufficient supporting evidence, establish an unlawful exchange or coordination. It also provides a useful contrast with earlier cases in which the Board found that indirect information exchanges through suppliers had facilitated coordination between competing retailers.

At the procedural level, the Council of State’s judgment concerning the deletion of WhatsApp correspondence during an on-site inspection provides important guidance on the limits of the Authority’s investigative powers. The case concerned an obstruction fine imposed following the deletion of messages from a personally owned mobile device. The Council of State upheld the annulment of the fine, finding that the Authority had not established through concrete evidence that the correspondence constituted undertaking data falling within its inspection powers. The judgment does not provide a general defence for deleting communications during inspections, nor does it exclude personal devices from examination where they contain business-related information. Its significance instead lies in the distinction between the Authority’s broad investigative powers and the obligation to demonstrate that the material being examined falls within their lawful scope.

We close with two merger control decisions that illustrate the Board’s increasingly detailed approach to remedy design. In the Kars Çimento acquisition, the Board accepted an extensive package of behavioural commitments despite exceptionally high combined market shares in certain regional cement markets and a recommendation from the case handlers to prohibit the transaction. The commitments include an inflation-linked price cap, production and supply obligations, protections for dealers and customers, and ongoing monitoring requirements. The decision is notable for the degree of regulatory oversight it introduces into the merged undertaking’s commercial operations. Nevertheless, the Board’s acceptance of these remedies was closely tied to the absence of a suitable structural solution and should not necessarily be understood as a general departure from its preference for structural remedies.

The CoreX/Polisan decision provides a different example of how merger concerns may be resolved through carefully structured commitments. Faced with significant competitive concerns in regional port services markets, the Board took account of a separate, ongoing restructuring within the Yıldırım family that would ultimately eliminate the relevant horizontal overlap. Rather than requiring an additional divestiture, it accepted interim operational and commercial commitments designed to preserve competition pending completion of that restructuring. Read alongside Kars Çimento, the decision demonstrates the flexibility of the Board’s remedial approach, whilst also illustrating the increasingly significant role of enforceable behavioural obligations in securing merger clearance.

This issue of 2026 brings together developments that reflect the breadth and increasing complexity of Turkish competition law enforcement. From tailored merger remedies and sector-wide policy initiatives to questions of evidence, cartel facilitator liability and investigative powers, the decisions discussed demonstrate how substantive competition concerns and procedural considerations continue to shape the Authority’s practice. We have sought to highlight not only the immediate significance of these developments, but also their broader implications for businesses and practitioners navigating an evolving regulatory environment. We hope readers will find this edition both informative and of practical value.

by Togan Turan

Azimut’s acquisition of Yapı Kredi Portföy: competition approvals for a long-term strategic partnership

Introduction

The Board has granted unconditional merger clearance for Azimut’s proposed acquisition of Yapı Kredi Portföy Yönetimi AŞ (“Yapı Kredi Portföy”) and a separate individual exemption for the accompanying 15-year distribution partnership with Yapı ve Kredi Bankası AŞ (“Yapı Kredi”). The decisions dated 10 September and 15 October 2026, respectively, mark important competition law milestones for the transaction.

Merger clearance

The acquisition will bring Yapı Kredi Portföy under Azimut’s sole control, strengthening the group’s existing presence in Türkiye’s portfolio management sector. Although both businesses are active in portfolio management, the competitive assessment was supported by the presence of strong alternative providers and favourable market concentration indicators. In particular, the market concentration analysis indicated a low level of post-transaction concentration and only a limited increase resulting from the acquisition, supporting the conclusion that effective competition would be maintained. The Board cleared the acquisition without conditions. The separate exemption addresses the parties’ continuing distribution relationship, rather than the change of control itself.

The parties’ activities encompass investment funds, pension funds and discretionary portfolios for individual and institutional investors. The combination is expected to create Türkiye’s second-largest asset manager, with approximately EUR 29 billion in assets under management, making Türkiye Azimut’s third-largest market globally by assets under management. The transaction combines an established international asset management platform with one of Türkiye’s major banking distribution networks. Yapı Kredi’s network includes more than 730 branches, over 5,000 relationship managers and extensive digital channels. This reach provides the commercial context for the accompanying partnership, which is intended to expand access to a broader range of investment solutions.

Individual exemption for the distribution arrangement

The individual exemption covers the full 15-year term of the associated distribution arrangement. Its duration makes the outcome particularly noteworthy: the envisaged non-compete obligation extends beyond the period available under the block exemption regime, requiring a separate individual exemption assessment.

The rationale centres on combining Azimut’s international investment expertise and product development capabilities with Yapı Kredi’s nationwide distribution network. The partnership is expected to broaden the range of investment solutions available to customers while preserving continuity of the existing product offering. Its long-term structure provides a platform for developing the cooperation and bringing international asset management capabilities to a wider investor base.

The distribution arrangement positions the relevant products as Yapı Kredi’s primary and preferred asset management offering, while preserving agreed exceptions and remaining subject to applicable regulatory requirements. The partnership also has the potential to strengthen cross-border investment links: Azimut’s global network could help introduce Turkish investment products to foreign investors and channel international capital towards Turkish investment opportunities.

Key takeaway

While the Board has assessed comparable distribution arrangements in the bancassurance sector, this is the first individual exemption granted for an agreement of this nature in Türkiye’s portfolio management industry. The decisions provide a reference point for long-term partnerships between banks and independent asset managers, illustrating the separate competition assessments of the acquisition and the accompanying distribution arrangement.

by Oğulcan Halebak, Mehmet Fırat Müezzinoğlu

Türkiye’s labour market investigation: settlement fines already exceed billions, with more potentially to come

Background and scope of the investigation

On 24 February 2026, the Authority announced that the Board had launched an investigation into 26 undertakings over alleged anti-competitive practices in labour markets. The investigation followed a preliminary investigation into allegations of no-poach agreements and/or exchanges of competitively sensitive information concerning the labour market.

The investigation covers 13 banks/participation banks, four insurance companies and nine information technology companies. Its scope is particularly noteworthy, as it extends beyond undertakings operating in the same sector and reflects the potential competition concerns arising from arrangements between employers in various industries.

According to their announcements on the Public Disclosure Platform (“KAP”), Akbank TAŞ (“Akbank”), Türkiye Garanti Bankası AŞ (“Garanti BBVA”) and QNB Bank AŞ (“QNB”) have each reached a settlement with the Board. The disclosed administrative fines are as follows:

• On 12 October 2026, Akbank announced that the investigation had been concluded in respect of the bank through settlement under the Board’s decision numbered 26-30/899-383, with an administrative fine of TRY 1,713,897,558.
• On 21 September 2026, Garanti BBVA announced that the Board decided to conclude the investigation in respect of Garanti BBVA through its settlement decision numbered 26-19/601-237. According to the announcement, Garanti BBVA will pay an administrative fine of TRY 1,547,608,979.25.
• On 26 May 2026, QNB also announced that it had opted for settlement in the same investigation, resulting in an administrative fine of TRY 1,007,484,234.

The settlements highlighted above concern only three of the 26 undertakings within the scope of the investigation. To date, the outcome in respect of the remaining undertakings has not been established on the basis of the publicly available sources.^[1]

Nevertheless, the aggregate fines disclosed by these three banks alone, exceeding TRY 4 billion, illustrate the financial scale of the proceedings and the substantial exposure associated with competition law infringements in labour markets. These amounts may represent the highest fines imposed to date for labour market infringements in Turkish competition law enforcement, while no publicly available information has yet been identified to confirm the outcome of the investigation in respect of the remaining 23 undertakings.

Competition law enforcement in labour markets

Competition law concerns are not limited to traditional commercial arrangements involving prices, customers or market allocation. Undertakings that do not compete for the same customers may nevertheless compete for employees with comparable skills and qualifications. Against this background, labour market practices have become an increasingly important focus for the Authority in recent years.

The inclusion of banks, insurers and information technology companies within the scope of the investigation confirms the importance of assessing competitive relationships from a labour market perspective, rather than solely by reference to the sectors in which undertakings conduct their commercial activities.

From a compliance perspective, these developments underline the importance of reviewing human resources-related communications and arrangements with other employers regardless of the specific sector. In this context, particular attention should be given to, among other things, recruitment restrictions, discussions concerning employment terms and exchanges of competitively sensitive information, such as salaries, employee benefits and salary increase rates.

by Sabiha Ulusoy, Ceren Özkorkut

The Turkish Competition Authority’s pharmaceutical sector inquiry and workshop

Introduction

On 10 August 2026, the Authority published the Preliminary Report. The publication follows the inquiry initiated by the Board’s decision dated 8 December 2021 and numbered 21-59/844-M. Covering pharmaceutical production, market entry and distribution, the Preliminary Report examines how intellectual property rights, sectoral regulation and commercial arrangements affect competition. Its findings were subsequently discussed at the Competition in the Pharmaceutical Sector Workshop held in Ankara on 21 September 2026 (the “Workshop”).

A central message is that compliance with pharmaceutical regulation does not, by itself, ensure compliance with competition law. Against this background, the Preliminary Report combines an enforcement perspective with proposals for targeted regulatory improvements. These proposals remain subject to further assessment and stakeholder consultation, with stakeholder input intended to inform the findings and recommendations of the final report, which remains in preparation.

The preliminary report’s key findings and recommendations

At the production stage, the Preliminary Report considers patent strategies capable of delaying generic entry, including “evergreening”, through which secondary patents may prolong effective exclusivity. It recognises the importance of protecting innovation whilst examining potentially exclusionary uses of patent procedures and settlements. In this context, it refers to the European Commission’s (“Commission”) EUR 462 million fine in the Teva/Copaxone case, which concerned divisional patent strategies and systematic disparagement of competing medicines.^[2] The focus is therefore on the exclusionary use of patent procedures and associated conduct, rather than the mere existence of secondary patents.

The Preliminary Report also examines whether patent settlements may restrict generic entry. The Authority requested information from approximately 50 undertakings concerning around 250 patent cases and, following consolidation of the data, examined 26 cases. It provisionally concluded that no agreement categorisable as pay-for-delay had been identified in the cases reviewed, while cautioning that patent settlements should not therefore be regarded as entirely free of competition law risks.

Alongside these conduct-related concerns, the Preliminary Report identifies areas in which greater transparency and institutional coordination could improve market entry conditions. It recommends making information on disputed patents more accessible and strengthening cooperation between the Turkish Patent and Trademark Office and the judiciary, allowing interested parties to follow and, where appropriate, participate in relevant proceedings. It further calls for clarification of the procedural framework governing the Authority’s compulsory licensing powers in cases involving competition infringements.

At market entry, “product hopping” raises a related concern as withdrawing an existing medicine and cancelling its marketing authorisation whilst directing demand towards a modified product may obstruct generic applications relying on the original medicine. As discussed in the Preliminary Report, AstraZeneca illustrates how withdrawing marketing authorisations may impede generic entry by preventing reliance on the reference product’s regulatory dossier. The Commission’s abuse finding concerning generic entry was upheld by the General Court and the Court of Justice.^[3] The Authority recommends reviewing the Turkish Medicines and Medical Devices Agency’s (“TİTCK”) rules and, where necessary, allowing continued reliance on the withdrawn product’s supporting data. The competitive assessment should also account for therapeutic improvements and efficiencies.

Reimbursement rules present another potential entry barrier. Under the fast-track procedure described in the Preliminary Report, applicants must generally price at least 5% below the lowest-priced medicine in the relevant group, even where that medicine is not actually available. A low-priced product can therefore impede rivals’ access to reimbursement without reducing the reimbursement ceiling if it remains below the applicable 1% market-share threshold. The Authority recommends that the Social Security Institution (“SGK”) align these mechanisms with actual availability and reassess whether that threshold adequately reflects patient access.

Distribution concerns centre on the State Supply Office’s (“DMO”) Sağlık Market procurement system. Centralised purchasing already delivers many efficiencies previously invoked to justify exclusive wholesalers, weakening the case for a mandatory sole authorised seller in each province. Drawing on analysis of more than 50,000 procurement items, the Authority proposes shared exclusivity allowing two to five authorised sellers, whilst retaining safeguards against the same wholesaler simultaneously representing competing products. The proposal seeks to increase intra-brand competition. Individual exemption claims would need concrete, agreement-specific evidence of efficiencies. This would entail a reassessment of the efficiencies supporting earlier exemption decisions. As the Preliminary Report notes, the Board granted exemptions to exclusive arrangements covering DMO tenders in its Bayer decision dated 28 July 2020 and numbered 20-36/488-214 and its Novo Nordisk decision dated 22 September 2022 and numbered 22-43/633-264. The Preliminary Report now questions whether the same justifications remain persuasive under centralised procurement.^[4]

Beyond public procurement, the Preliminary Report draws attention to concentration among wholesalers supplying retail pharmacies. A small number of large wholesalers benefit from economies of scale, purchasing power, extensive logistics networks and financial capacity, whilst smaller and regional wholesalers generally act as complementary suppliers. Pharmacists’ cooperatives are recognised as an important counterweight that supports pharmacies’ bargaining power. The Authority considers that this market structure should inform the assessment of agreements granting exclusivity or limiting the number of wholesalers, particularly given the potential effects on discounts, payment terms and coordination risks.

Finally, the Preliminary Report identifies uncertainty over the allocation and implementation of the public institution discount (“KKİ”). Retrospective discount arrangements may burden pharmacies and expose commercially sensitive information. Proposed measures include expressly assigning financial responsibility to suppliers, integrating SGK’s MEDULA reimbursement system with the Pharmaceutical Track and Trace System (“İTS”), and establishing a security account to compensate pharmacies for unapplied discounts. These recommendations seek to improve implementation within the existing regulatory framework.

The workshop’s main themes and stakeholder perspectives

The Workshop’s three sessions brought together the Authority, public bodies, academics and industry representatives. Discussions explored how the Preliminary Report’s proposals would operate in practice, alongside the broader balance between affordable medicines, innovation and sustainable supply. Alongside these themes, Authority representatives addressed market definition and potential competition in merger reviews. They highlighted that ATC-3 is one of the starting points for market definition, with markets potentially delineated as narrowly as the active ingredient, and emphasised the importance of disclosing potential competitive overlaps in merger filings, including those involving products under development.^[5]

On intellectual property, academic contributions emphasised that secondary patents should not automatically be treated as evergreening: their purpose, scope and effects on generic entry require examination in each case. Industry perspectives differed. Research-based manufacturers sought more effective protection of regulatory data and targeted incentives for innovative treatments, whilst representatives of domestic manufacturers favoured retaining the existing data-exclusivity framework. The discussion therefore left open how incentives for innovation should be calibrated against timely generic entry.

Public-sector contributions placed particular emphasis on actual access. TİTCK described stock monitoring and an artificial intelligence-based early-warning system, acknowledging that a 1% market share may not establish meaningful availability. SGK’s representative distinguished temporary inactivation of unavailable medicines from outright removal from reimbursement lists, noting the burden of subsequent re-entry. These observations highlighted the need to coordinate pricing, reimbursement and supply monitoring when addressing products that remain listed but are not effectively accessible.

The KKİ discussion provided a material update to the Preliminary Report. SGK’s representative stated that sanctions for suppliers failing to apply the discount had recently been introduced and reiterated that suppliers bear the underlying responsibility. However, the Turkish Pharmacists’ Association questioned how pharmacies’ resulting losses would be compensated. Data access also remained contested, as TİTCK described IP-based restrictions on İTS access, whilst the pharmacists’ representative reported continuing requests to enter pharmacy credentials into third-party software. Participants expressed support for MEDULA–İTS integration, although its implementation remained a matter for further coordination.

The discussions on distribution highlighted that the tender analysis focused on competition between brands, while the proposed shared exclusivity model aims to promote competition among wholesalers supplying the same medicine. Authority speakers presented the proposal as flexible, allowing exceptions supported by concrete efficiencies. They also discussed the EU’s treatment of tender participation as passive sales, without announcing corresponding amendments in Türkiye. These qualifications are relevant to assessing both the evidence supporting reform and its potential effect on existing agreements.

Industry representatives further argued that effective competition depends on economically sustainable supply. They highlighted lengthy authorisation procedures, reimbursement uncertainty, financing pressures and the gap between the pharmaceutical pricing exchange rate and the market rate as factors influencing investment and product availability. Calls for regular inter-agency cooperation and common data-based monitoring reflected the interconnected nature of these concerns.

Potential implications and outlook

For pharmaceutical companies and distributors, the Preliminary Report and the Workshop identify practical areas for review. Their implications will depend on the final report, subsequent measures and the circumstances of the business concerned.

Patent settlements and product lifecycle decisions. The discussion highlights the importance of distinguishing legitimate protection of innovation and therapeutic improvements from potentially exclusionary conduct. Where relevant, the commercial context, related agreements and effects on entry may warrant consideration; neither secondary patents nor settlements should be characterised as problematic without a case-specific assessment.

Distribution arrangements. The emphasis on agreement-specific efficiencies highlights the value of concrete evidence supporting exclusivity, particularly under centralised procurement. The treatment of tender participation and shared exclusivity also warrants monitoring.

Reimbursement and availability. The interaction between pricing, reimbursement and actual supply merits attention where it affects market access, including across entities within the same economic group. Relevant considerations include the applicable framework and the reasons for limited availability.

Discount implementation and information flows. The KKİ discussion highlights the relevance of verification processes, third-party access to pharmacy information and arrangements for compensating losses. MEDULA–İTS integration remains a subject for coordination between the relevant public bodies.

Transactions and pipeline products. For businesses contemplating acquisitions, narrow market definitions and potential competitive relationships are relevant to transaction planning and the preparation of information for merger filings.

Conclusion

The Preliminary Report and the Workshop indicate continued scrutiny of practices that use pharmaceutical regulation or distribution arrangements to restrict market access. Although the proposals do not themselves establish new obligations, they identify areas warranting closer compliance review, including patent settlements, product withdrawal strategies, reimbursement practices and exclusivity arrangements. The consultation also demonstrates that improving competition requires coordination with innovation incentives and supply sustainability. The final report will be important in determining which proposals are retained and how they inform regulatory reform and the Authority’s enforcement priorities.

by Tuba Yeşil, Mehmet Fırat Müezzinoğlu

The Board’s Adkoturk decision: restrictions on retail incentives to protect shelf access

Introduction

On 23 September 2026, the Board imposed an interim measure on Adkoturk Gıda San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. (“Adkoturk”), the producer of Indomie. Under the measure, Adkoturk may not provide retail outlets with free products, delisting budgets, activity budgets, visibility support or similar commercial advantages until a final decision is taken^[6].

The decision focuses on whether these commercial arrangements restrict competing suppliers’ access to retail shelves. It also extends the Board’s recent scrutiny of shelf access in FMCG markets, addressing the incentives offered to retailers rather than requiring a specified proportion of retail space to be reserved for competitors.

The decision is particularly relevant to suppliers with a strong retail presence, as it shows how the Board assesses their market power and the impact of their dealings with retailers on competition. It also highlights how payments and other commercial support can affect shelf access and, in turn, competitors’ ability to reach customers.

Background and market position

The proceedings originated from a confidential complaint submitted on 25 May 2026. The complainant alleged that Adkoturk had maintained a very high market share for more than three years and had created de facto shelf exclusivity through payments described as “activity budgets” and “category management contributions”. It requested that at least 30% of shelf space be reserved for competing products.

In its assessment, the Board defined the instant noodle market for the first time in Turkish competition law practice. It distinguished instant noodles from egg noodles and pasta, taking account of differences in preparation, purpose and conditions of consumption and portion sizes, as well as the raw materials and production lines required.

On the supply side, the Board rejected substitution between instant noodles and egg noodles because their production required different raw materials and production lines. This supported its decision to assess Adkoturk’s position within a separate instant noodle market, rather than a broader market including those products or pasta. The relevant geographic market was defined as Türkiye. The Board therefore assessed Adkoturk’s position and the alternatives available to retailers nationally, whilst separately examining the discount channel in view of its substantial share of total instant noodle sales.

Nielsen data covering 2024 to 2026 showed that Adkoturk’s market share by value had increased whilst those of Erişler, Oba and Unilever had declined. Distribution and in-store presence indicators also pointed to a substantial advantage over competitors. Adkoturk’s position was particularly strong in discount chains, which accounted for the largest share of sales.

Adkoturk’s share was several times greater than that of its closest competitor, but the Board’s findings went beyond market shares alone, as numerical and weighted distribution indicators supported the same picture. Outlets where Adkoturk was not present accounted for only a marginal proportion of sales volume, reinforcing the Board’s assessment of its extensive retail presence.

The Board also considered Adkoturk’s first-mover advantage and established production presence. Although major retailers such as BİM and A101 accounted for substantial portions of its sales, the Board found serious indications that, given the limited strength of alternative suppliers, retailers lacked sufficient countervailing buyer power. It therefore concluded that Adkoturk held a dominant position.

Evidence of restrictions on shelf access

Documents obtained during the on-site inspection, covering February 2018 to July 2026, linked Adkoturk’s commercial arrangements to the removal of competing products and the expansion of its own shelf presence. The evidence concerned three principal forms of conduct.

The period covered by the evidence also raised a limitation issue. Addressing the eight-year limitation period, the Board relied on the single and continuous infringement doctrine. Under this approach, acts forming part of an overall plan with a common economic objective may be assessed as a single infringement. The Board therefore retained the earliest document within the scope of its assessment, considering the conduct as part of a continuing course of action rather than treating each communication as an isolated event.

First, internal communications referred to competitors’ display stands being dismantled and replaced, alongside instructions that “at least 80% of the shelf should be ours” and that shelves should be arranged according to market share, with the Board referring to attempts to secure 80 to 95% of shelf space. The Board suspected that these were management instructions implemented by field personnel. Second, the documents pointed to delisting arrangements, including a reference to a TRY 30 million budget in connection with the delisting of five Knorr products at a discount chain, the replacement of a retailer’s private-label product with an Adkoturk product, and a reported agreement with another chain to delist a competitor entirely. Finally, the evidence linked commercial support to specific shelf arrangements, including support provided in return for additional shelf space and free products supplied in return for a gondola dedicated exclusively to Adkoturk, together with an invoice issued by a national chain referring to “visibility”.

The organisational context of the communications was also relevant. The documents came largely from Adkoturk’s own sales organisation and combined percentage-based shelf targets with discussions of removing identified rival brands. This supported the Board’s suspicion that the practices reflected an organised commercial approach extending from management to implementation in retail outlets.

The Board also examined Adkoturk’s turnover, logistics, category support and activity premiums. Rates varied between retailers, and Adkoturk confirmed that it had neither a uniform discount model nor an internal written procedure governing these arrangements. The Board considered that this individualised structure strengthened their loyalty-inducing effect. In the Metro agreement, it identified a target-based premium calculated on net purchase turnover, which it considered indicative of a retroactive loyalty mechanism, although the contract did not specify the targets actually applied.

Premium rates and budgets were frequently agreed orally or by email outside the framework contracts. Although this prevented the Board from establishing the full scope of the schemes at the preliminary stage, the documents obtained in the inspection still linked commercial support to the removal of competing products.

The interim measure

The Board adopted the measure under Article 9(4) of Law No. 4054, which permits intervention where serious and irreparable harm may arise before a final decision. Such intervention must preserve the position existing before the infringement and remain within the scope of the final decision.

In explaining the evidentiary threshold, the Board noted that its earlier practice had required a manifest infringement, but that it had subsequently moved to a standard based on strong suspicion sufficient to justify interim intervention. The assessment at this stage therefore concerned whether the available evidence warranted action before the investigation was completed.

The Board considered Adkoturk’s market position, financial strength and brand recognition alongside the evidence suggesting that commercial advantages were being used to remove competitors from retail shelves. It found a strong suspicion of exclusionary conduct and a high risk that competitors would be prevented from reaching customers during the investigation.

The resulting prohibition was adopted unanimously and remains applicable until the final decision. It does not allocate shelf space to competitors or require retailers to stock particular competing brands. Instead, it restricts the commercial advantages that the Board suspects were being used to secure exclusionary shelf arrangements. The measure does not constitute a final finding of infringement.

The broader FMCG context

The decision follows several recent cases in which the Board has sought to protect competitors’ access to retail space. In Frito Lay, 30% of the supplier’s own display stands was reserved for competing products, with physical separation and labelling. The Unilever/Magnum measure required 30% of each cooler in outlets of 100 m² or less, where Unilever’s cooler is the only one accessible to consumers, to be allocated to competing products as a labelled block, with the allocation capable of increasing to 50% upon request. In Coca-Cola Satış ve Dağıtım, commitments increased competitors’ access from 25% to 35% of cooler capacity, supported by physical dividers, labelling and independent measurement. Similarly, in Haribo, 30% of the visible area of display stands in traditional outlets of 200 m² or less was reserved for competing brands without stands of their own. These cases reflect an increasingly established approach combining specified allocation ratios with practical requirements to ensure that competitors can effectively use the reserved space. The emphasis on smaller outlets is particularly relevant where a single cooler or display stand may accommodate an entire product category.

Adkoturk addresses the same concern through restrictions on retailer incentives. The Board has prohibited the benefits suspected of securing exclusionary shelf arrangements without specifying how retail space must be divided. Whether the final decision will maintain this approach or introduce a shelf allocation requirement remains to be seen.

Conclusion

The Adkoturk decision shows that commercial support offered to retailers can attract early intervention where it is linked to the exclusion of competing products. For suppliers with strong market positions, the relevant question is how rebates, free products and promotional budgets affect competitors’ access to retail shelves.

The decision also underlines the importance of consistency between formal contracts and day-to-day sales practices. Internal messages, emails and arrangements agreed outside framework contracts were central to the Board’s assessment. Reviewing contractual terms alone may therefore provide an incomplete picture: the objectives communicated to sales teams and the shelf arrangements secured through commercial spending are equally relevant.

The absence of complete contractual documentation did not keep the arrangements outside the investigation. Although it limited the Board’s ability to establish the full scope of the schemes, the messages and emails showed how commercial support was linked to shelf outcomes. The case therefore illustrates why the way payments are described in accounting records or contracts cannot be considered separately from their commercial purpose and implementation. Documents from a single on-site inspection were central to the Board’s finding of strong suspicion, which allowed it to impose restrictions while its investigation continued.

by Fırat Eğrilmez, Mehmet Fırat Müezzinoğlu

When a supplier becomes a cartel facilitator: the Aydın ready-mixed concrete decision

Introduction

The Board has published its reasoned decision concluding the investigation into price fixing and customer/region allocation in the ready-mixed concrete sector in Aydın (the “Decision”)^[7]. The Board found that Batıbeton Sanayi A.Ş. (“Batıbeton”), Öztürk Ticaret (“Öztürk”) and Şölen Çimento Yapı İnş. San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. (“Şölen”) had violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054. It further held that Çimentaş İzmir Çimento Fabrikası Türk A.Ş. (“Çimentaş”), a cement producer not active in the ready-mixed concrete market in which the cartel operated, had participated in the infringement as a cartel facilitator by mediating the implementation of a customer allocation agreement among ready-mixed concrete producers in the Didim district. No infringement was found for the remaining six investigated undertakings.

The Decision is noteworthy as it addresses when an undertaking that is not a competitor in the cartelised market may be held liable for knowingly facilitating a cartel, and the standard of proof applied in that context.

Procedural background and relevant markets

The investigation originated from a complaint by the Turkish Ministry of Trade alleging that ready-mixed concrete prices in the Nazilli district were approximately twice those in the Aydın city centre. Following a preliminary investigation and on-site inspections, the Board initiated a full-fledged investigation against 19 undertakings on 26 October 2023 and, on 29 February 2024, opened a separate investigation into two cement producers, Batıçim Batı Anadolu Çimento Sanayii A.Ş. (“Batıçim”) and Çimentaş, which it merged with the ongoing investigation. Eleven undertakings settled, while Batıbeton and Batıçim remained parties despite entering into settlement negotiations, as they failed to submit their settlement texts on time.

The relevant product market was the “production and sale of ready-mixed concrete”. Following its precedents drawing 50–55 km radii around plants, while noting that the decisive factor is the time between production and pouring, the Board defined three geographic markets: “Aydın Centre–Nazilli”, “Aydın Centre–Söke” and “Söke–Didim”.

Findings concerning the investigated undertakings

A group of ready-mixed concrete undertakings met at gatherings described as “tea” or “table”, where they allocated customers and regions through shared lists, agreed on prices and monitored compliance. As the settling parties had admitted the infringement, the Board assessed the evidence separately for each remaining party, including Batıçim and Çimentaş as alleged facilitators.

Batıbeton and “half-finished jobs”

For Batıbeton, the evidence covered price fixing and customer allocation between January 2018 and March 2023. The Board relied on repeated references to direct contact with Batıbeton in exchanges involving Asbeton Yapı (“Asbeton”) and Mendeş İnşaat (“Mendeş”), including an August 2022 message reporting that Batıbeton would hold a meeting to discuss regional prices. It rejected Batıbeton’s argument that third-party correspondence could not be used against it, as the messages recorded direct contacts rather than hearsay and were corroborated by Batıbeton’s own March 2023 correspondence, in which it declined to supply an ongoing project of Canatanlar İnşaat (“Canatanlar”) after being contacted by Canatanlar. Declining such “half-finished jobs” may be a legitimate commercial decision but amounts to customer allocation where it results from contact with competitors.

The resellers: Şölen and Öztürk

Şölen participated in customer allocation and price fixing between February 2018 and March 2023, its correspondence including questions as to the undertaking under whose name certain projects appeared on the allocation lists. The Board rejected Şölen’s argument that, as a reseller without production, it could not be party to an agreement among producers, noting that it competed with the producers in selling ready-mixed concrete and that communications aimed at implementing collectively agreed prices may in themselves establish an infringement. For Öztürk, also a reseller, the Board relied on a single exchange with Türen Kireç, a settling party, concerning jointly determined prices, and found a concurrence of wills on price fixing.

The undertakings cleared, including Batıçim

By contrast, being named in other undertakings’ correspondence did not, without further support, establish the participation of Beton-Taş, Çimbeton, Kabasakal, Serttaş and Türen Yapı; the correspondence concerning Kabasakal, for instance, reflected a supplier–dealer risk assessment rather than customer allocation. The same approach determined the outcome for Batıçim, part of the same economic entity as Batıbeton. The allegation rested on Asbeton correspondence from January 2018 suggesting that Batıçim employees had attended a “table” meeting. Although that document was relied upon against Batıbeton, for which it was corroborated, its content could not be verified and no other document naming Batıçim was found, so the Board did not find that Batıçim had facilitated the cartel. It noted, however, that had its attendance been proven, Batıçim’s indirect benefit through Batıbeton and its say over whether the “table” continued could have supported a facilitator finding.

Legal framework and standard of proof for cartel facilitation

The Board relied on Article 3(1)(d) of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Detecting Cartels, which defines a cartel facilitator as an undertaking that mediates or facilitates the establishment and/or maintenance of a cartel without operating at the same level of the production or distribution chain as the cartel members^[8]. The Board further relied on Article 14 of Law No. 5326 on Misdemeanours, which treats participants as perpetrators without distinguishing principals from instigators or accessories and requires an intentional and unlawful act for participation, and held that a facilitator is liable to the same extent as the parties to the agreement. Since participation requires intent, the Board examined whether the alleged facilitator had acted knowingly and willingly within the meaning of Article 21 of the Turkish Criminal Code. It also referred to its Duru Bilişim and Taximeter decisions fining non-parties as facilitators^[9] and to the AC-Treuhand judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union^[10].

In line with the decisional practice of the European Commission, the case law of the General Court and its own precedents, the Board identified three conditions for facilitator liability: (i) knowledge of, or the ability to foresee, the existence of a cartel established by others, (ii) actual contribution to the common objectives of the cartel members and (iii) intent to contribute to those objectives. It first examined whether a cartel existed and whether there was a concurrence of wills between the alleged facilitator and the cartel members, and then whether the facilitator benefited from the cartel, whether its role was significant for the cartel’s continuity and whether it acted knowingly and willingly.

As to the standard of proof, the Board emphasised that all forms of evidence may be used, that probative value depends on the reliability of the evidence, including its type, content, author and circumstances of creation, that a single piece of evidence may suffice in certain cases and that evidence must be assessed as a whole. Referring to Council of State case law, it noted that evidence of a cartel need not be obtained from each^[11] participant.

by Fırat Eğrilmez, Aslı Su Çoruk

The Board’s assessment concerning Çimentaş

The hotel project correspondence

The allegation rested on WhatsApp correspondence of January and February 2023 between employees of Kösem and Çimentaş. Kösem sourced all of its cement from Çimentaş and was its only customer in Didim, whereas Ufuk purchased its cement from Oyak Çimento. On 12 January 2023, referring to a hotel project that Kösem was supplying together with Değişim, the Kösem employee asked the Çimentaş employee not to give way if Oyak Çimento raised the matter, and the latter replied that he had already told them not to interfere. On 16 January 2023, the Kösem employee asked the Çimentaş employee to visit Ufuk and Efe Beton and warn them off the hotel, as both objected to Kösem supplying it, which the Çimentaş employee accepted.

Existence of the cartel and concurrence of wills

Although the settlements had established a customer allocation cartel among Değişim, Kösem and Ufuk in Didim, Çimentaş was not involved in that evidence, so an allocation concerning the hotel project itself had to be shown. The Board found that Ufuk had not bid for the project, that the hotel was supplied only by Kösem, through Değişim, and that the price for the project was increased on the date of the second exchange. As the correspondence matched actual market conduct and Ufuk’s participation in the cartel was supported by other evidence, the Board found that a cartel existed and that there was a concurrence of wills between Çimentaş and the cartel members. It rejected the defence that the correspondence concerned a cement discount for the hotel. Only the February correspondence related to cement prices, and the discount, granted about 40 days after the first correspondence, was not reflected in the hotel prices. By contrast, no concurrence of wills was established for Oyak Çimento, which had in fact granted discounts to Ufuk, or for Efe Beton.

Awareness, contribution and intent

The Board found that Çimentaş was aware of the arrangement, as it contacted Oyak Çimento without asking any questions, and neither Kösem’s requests nor Çimentaş’s compliance would have been rational absent an agreement among the producers. Çimentaş benefited indirectly, since every delivery by Kösem to the hotel meant additional cement sales, whereas a delivery by Ufuk would have deprived it of that revenue. The expressions in the correspondence showed that Çimentaş had assumed an active role in maintaining the allocation and acted knowingly and willingly. A facilitator is not required to impose sanctions or offer incentives. Çimentaş was held liable not merely because of the ready-mixed concrete cartel’s existence, but for its own conduct in the correspondence and its role in the absence of bids that followed it. On the standard of proof, the Board treated the correspondence as another undertaking’s internal correspondence in relation to Oyak Çimento and Efe Beton, requiring corroboration, whereas Çimentaş was a direct party to it, so no additional evidence was needed concerning the statements in that correspondence.

The Board also dismissed Çimentaş’s argument that its inclusion in the same investigation as its subsidiary Çimbeton breached the ne bis in idem principle, as the two were investigated for different conduct in different geographic markets. Finally, Çimentaş’s share of cement sales in Didim could not be considered very low and, in any event, limited market power does not preclude liability under Article 4 and may only be considered in setting the fine.

Calculation of the fines

The fines were calculated under the new Regulation on Fines of 27 December 2024^[12], after a comparison with the repealed regulation to ensure no less favourable outcome, and the cartel nature of the conduct was taken into account in determining the starting rates.

For Batıbeton, the Board excluded a two-year-and-seven-month gap for which no evidence was found, resulting in an infringement duration of two years and seven months and an increase of two-fifths. Şölen’s starting rate was doubled for an infringement exceeding five years. For Çimentaş, whose infringement lasted less than one year, the rate was increased by half to 3% on grounds of recidivism, as its conduct between 12 January and 24 February 2023 occurred within eight years of the earlier Board decision imposing a fine on it under Article 4^[13]; mitigation was then applied for the low share of the affected turnover and its export revenues. Recidivism was held to attach to the undertaking, whatever the market or conduct concerned, but was not applied to Batıbeton for the 2016 fine imposed on its parent Batıçim, a separate legal entity. Fines of TRY 37,851,666.03, TRY 37,370,945.14, TRY 1,216,947.91 and TRY 28,308.08 were imposed on Batıbeton, Çimentaş, Şölen and Öztürk, respectively.

Conclusion

The Board held a cement producer not active in the cartelised market liable as a cartel facilitator under Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and Article 14 of the Law on Misdemeanours. It applied a three-limb test requiring knowledge of, or the ability to foresee, the cartel’s existence, actual contribution to its objectives and intent to contribute, and relied on a single exchange of correspondence to which the facilitator was a direct party, while declining to find an infringement where the same correspondence was an uncorroborated internal document for third parties, as well as for Batıçim. The Decision thus suggests that facilitator liability may rest on limited evidence, provided that the evidence directly reflects the facilitator’s own conduct.

by Fırat Eğrilmez, Aslı Su Çoruk

Following the information trail: inside the Turkish Competition Board’s dairy sector decision

Introduction

In its Dairy Sector decision^[14], the Board examined alleged exchanges of competitively sensitive information involving dairy suppliers Ak Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ (“Ak Gıda”) and Güney Süt Sanayi ve Gıda Maddeleri Ticaret AŞ (“Güney Süt”) and supermarket chains BİM Birleşik Mağazalar AŞ (“BİM”) and Şok Marketler Ticaret AŞ (“ŞOK”). The investigation concerned the alleged circulation of suppliers’ prices through retailer-supplier relationships and coordination of dairy supply prices. The decision illustrates how the Board assessed the alleged information flows against the documentary record and economic evidence, including findings that did not consistently point in the same direction.

Evidence from the on-site inspections

During the on-site inspections, the Authority obtained an internal Ak Gıda email dated 23 March 2021 in which an Ak Gıda industrial products sales manager described a conversation with Güney Süt about butter supplies. The manager stated that Güney Süt had complained that Ak Gıda was offering BİM UHT milk with a higher protein content at the same price and that he had avoided discussing the issue. Ak Gıda’s commercial director endorsed his response and asked colleagues not to bring up the subject in future conversations with the individual concerned.

The complainant had separately submitted two email chains from June 2022 between a Güney Süt sales manager and an employee of Yummy, which formed part of the same economic unit as Güney Süt. These emails contained spreadsheets listing prices attributed to competing dairy suppliers, alongside pricing information relating to BİM. Taken together, these materials led the Board to examine how Güney Süt had obtained the information and whether it had shared or used it to coordinate its conduct with other undertakings.

Two alleged information flows

The investigation focused on two allegations. The first was that Güney Süt had obtained competing dairy suppliers’ price information from BİM and passed it to ŞOK in return for increased purchases from Güney Süt. This raised concerns that Güney Süt had facilitated an indirect exchange of competitively sensitive procurement information between the two retailers, potentially strengthening ŞOK’s bargaining position.

The second allegation was that Güney Süt had shared information obtained from BİM with Ak Gıda, enabling the two suppliers to agree on dairy supply prices. This concerned coordination between competing suppliers, while the first allegation involved information flowing between competing retailers through Güney Süt. The Board assessed both allegations under Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”).

The Board considered the allegations against its framework for information exchange, including hub-and-spoke arrangements, in which competitors exchange information indirectly through a vertically related third party. The key question in this case was whether the evidence established the alleged information flows and coordination, rather than merely the existence of retailer-supplier relationships.

The Board’s assessment of the evidence

The Board first examined whether BİM had supplied competitors’ prices to Güney Süt. Prices in the spreadsheet identified as Evidence 2 matched BİM’s purchasing records, but this did not establish who had shared them. The BİM purchasing officer accused of passing on the information was not involved in the available correspondence with supplier Yörüksüt, while Ayca and Arpacı could not locate the relevant emails. The Board therefore found no conclusive evidence that the officer had transmitted these prices to Güney Süt.

The spreadsheet identified as Evidence 1 presented a different picture: seven of the 16 price entries matched the agreed supply prices, but none of the prices attributed to Ak Gıda matched its actual supply prices to BİM. The inspections also found no further evidence identifying how Güney Süt had obtained the information in either spreadsheet or who had supplied it. As the prices concerned past transactions, the Board considered that Güney Süt might instead have obtained them from the market or from customers during price negotiations.

Nor did the evidence establish that Güney Süt had passed the information to ŞOK in return for more business. ŞOK’s initial data suggested a substantial increase in purchases from Güney Süt, but ŞOK later corrected those figures because of a system error. The corrected data and comparisons across suppliers did not support the alleged arrangement. The Board therefore found no concrete evidence of either step in the alleged information chain: from BİM to Güney Süt, or from Güney Süt to ŞOK.

The Board also rejected the allegation that Güney Süt and Ak Gıda had coordinated supply prices. It read the March 2021 internal email as an account of Ak Gıda’s refusal to discuss its offer to BİM with Güney Süt, rather than evidence of coordination. The sales manager had avoided the subject, and the commercial director had endorsed that response. The mismatch between Ak Gıda’s actual prices and those held by Güney Süt, together with the absence of further supporting evidence, also weighed against the allegation.

Testing the allegations against market data

The Board supplemented its documentary assessment with economic analyses examining whether observed prices and purchasing volumes displayed patterns consistent with the allegations. These analyses used monthly data covering January 2020 to December 2024, subject to product availability. Their contribution was corroborative: they tested implications of the alleged arrangements rather than independently identifying who had communicated particular information.

Comparing supply prices

To test whether Ak Gıda and Güney Süt had coordinated their prices to BİM, the Board compared each supplier’s inflation-adjusted prices to BİM and ŞOK for one-litre full-fat milk and one-kilogram butter. Using a difference-in-differences method, the Board examined whether prices to BİM changed differently from prices to ŞOK after the purchasing officer implicated in the complaint joined BİM’s dairy purchasing team in October 2021 and left in May 2024. The aim was to see whether the alleged information sharing was reflected in the prices charged to BİM.

The results for Ak Gıda did not support coordination. Most tests found no statistically significant price effect. The significant milk-price findings pointed in the opposite direction to the allegation, with prices to BİM falling relative to those charged to ŞOK.

Güney Süt’s results were mixed. Some findings were consistent with the allegation, including a decline in milk prices to BİM relative to ŞOK after the officer left. However, the butter tests found no statistically significant effect, and the results across the analyses did not consistently support coordination.

The Board therefore found that the economic evidence did not clearly substantiate joint price-setting. The inconsistent results for Güney Süt, and the lack of similar supporting findings for Ak Gıda, limited the weight of the findings that supported the allegation.

Examining ŞOK’s purchases

The Board also tested whether ŞOK had bought more from Güney Süt in return for competitors’ price information. Using Welch’s t-tests^[15], it compared monthly purchases of six Mis private-label dairy products before and after the alleged arrangement began in January 2022 and the BİM purchasing officer joined and left the relevant team. If the allegation were correct, purchases would be expected to rise after the arrangement began and fall after the officer left.

The results did not show that pattern consistently. Purchases generally declined after the potential starting dates, rather than increasing as alleged. Although some declines after the officer’s departure were consistent with the allegation, the earlier trends pointed the other way. Taken together, the findings did not support the claim that ŞOK had rewarded Güney Süt’s alleged information sharing with increased purchases.

The outcome and what it means for businesses

The Board unanimously found no competition law infringement by Ak Gıda, Güney Süt, BİM or ŞOK and imposed no fines. The documents did not establish the alleged sharing of information, and the economic tests did not provide consistent support for the allegations.

The contrast with the Board’s earlier fast-moving consumer goods (“FMCG”) retailer–supplier decision^[16] is instructive. In that case, communications and price movements, considered together, showed how the supplier Pasifik had passed information between retailers and how the retailers had knowingly used it. In the dairy case, matching prices and mixed economic results were not enough to establish who had shared information or how the companies had used it.

For businesses, the practical takeaway is to keep clear boundaries around discussions of competitors’ prices and ensure commercial teams know how to respond to sensitive requests. This decision turned on the evidence in this particular case. It should not be treated as permission to share competitors’ pricing information through customers or suppliers.

by Oğulcan Halebak, Mehmet Fırat Müezzinoğlu

Personal devices and on-site inspections: the council of state’s assessment of an obstruction fine

The Board has generally regarded the deletion of digital correspondence after an on-site inspection begins as obstruction, regardless of whether the material can subsequently be recovered. Its decisions nevertheless recognise exceptions arising from evidentiary gaps or the particular circumstances of an inspection. This approach forms the background to the Council of State’s recent assessment of the deletion of WhatsApp correspondence from a personal device, in which it upheld the annulment of the Board’s obstruction fine.

The Board’s approach to digital evidence

In 2021, the Board imposed a fine for the deletion of WhatsApp correspondence even though the messages were recovered using forensic tools and the undertaking had otherwise cooperated with the inspection. In another decision that year, technical difficulties prevented forensic access, leaving the nature of the deleted material unconfirmed after its deletion. The Board nevertheless imposed a fine, reasoning that recovery would not have altered its assessment.^[17] The Board took a different approach in 2022, when the evidence failed to establish whether any deletion had occurred or, if so, whether it had occurred after the inspection began. It therefore imposed no fine. That decision turned on the failure to establish the alleged conduct and its timing, rather than on the effect of recovering material known to have been deleted.^[18]

The Board’s decisions in 2023 illustrate the varying weight it attached to recovery and the circumstances of an inspection. It fined an undertaking for deleting business-related WhatsApp correspondence from personal devices where complete data integrity could not be established. In another case, it imposed no fine after approximately 1,500 emails were recovered and examined, taking into account the absence of infringement findings, the undertaking’s status as a third party and its lack of a motive to conceal information. A subsequent decision imposing a fine despite the recovery of deleted Outlook emails prompted a dissent favouring a more contextual assessment. Recovery thus remained relevant in some cases, but did not provide a universal and concrete defence.^[19] In 2024, the Board again imposed a fine where employees deleted WhatsApp correspondence from personal devices containing undertaking data and recovery was unsuccessful or incomplete. The decision reiterated the Board’s established position that proof of deletion after an inspection begins is sufficient for imposition of the fine that is procedural in nature, without any further consideration as to the deleted content or its recoverability.^[20]

The Board’s decisions in 2025 continued to reflect these contextual differences, resulting in different conclusions. It imposed no fine where leaving work-related messaging groups triggered automatic deletion, but the correspondence remained available on other devices and yielded no findings relevant to the investigation. Dissenting members considered that the deletion itself impaired access and data integrity and warranted monetary fines. In later decisions, the Board imposed fines where evidence obtained during a simultaneous inspection established deletion and where forensic tools recovered only part of the deleted correspondence. Taken together, these outcomes do not indicate a consistent shift towards a more lenient approach developed over the years.^[21]

Against this background, it is important to distinguish between the recovery of deleted material and the Authority’s power to inspect that material in the first place. The January 2026 judgment addresses the latter issue: whether the material examined on a personal device had been shown to constitute data belonging to the undertaking and therefore fell within the Authority’s power to inspect and to impose monetary fines if the inspection was obstructed.

The council of state’s decision

On 13 January 2026, the 13th Chamber of the Council of State (“Council of State”) upheld the annulment of an obstruction fine imposed under Article 16(1)(d) of Law No. 4054. The judgment, numbered E. 2023/2772, K. 2026/36, underscores the need for concrete evidence establishing that the material falls within the scope of the Authority’s inspection powers.

Background and the obstruction fine

The case arose from an investigation into alleged gentlemen’s agreements in the labour market. During an on-site inspection on 9 April 2021, the Authority examined a representative’s personal mobile device, which it considered to contain undertaking data. The examination revealed that correspondence in two WhatsApp groups, “HRBP” and “HRBP’lerle”, had been deleted using the “clear chat” function. The chat screens displayed only WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption notice.

The Authority obtained a technical opinion linking the timestamp of the system message to the deletion of correspondence on the day of the inspection. Correspondence from the “HRBP” group was also found on another representative’s device. Differences between the messages available on the two devices led the Board to conclude that correspondence had been deleted after the inspection began.

The Board considered that the deletion had hindered access to potential evidence and imposed an administrative fine of TRY 4,807,073 under Article 16(1)(d) of Law No. 4054.^[22]

Judicial review and the authority’s appeal

The Administrative Court annulled the fine, yet it recognised the principles that on-site inspections must be conducted without advance notice or interruption and that undertakings must refrain from destroying evidence once an inspection begins. However, it emphasised that conduct warranting an administrative sanction must be established by concrete information and documents.

In its assessment, the court took into account the undertaking’s instruction to employees not to delete correspondence, the availability of the messages on another employee’s device, the phone’s personal ownership and the finding that the correspondence did not concern company business. It concluded that the conduct did not justify the fine and that no other concrete evidence established the alleged obstruction. The regional administrative court upheld the annulment, after which the Authority appealed to the Council of State.

The authority’s arguments

The Authority argued that deletion after employees had been warned constituted obstruction, regardless of the content deleted. It characterised the fine as procedural and maintained that neither an intention to obstruct nor an attempt to destroy evidence had to be proved. It further submitted that requiring a separate assessment of whether the deleted material belonged to the undertaking would undermine the effectiveness of on-site inspections.

The scope of the inspection powers

Article 15 of Law No. 4054 authorises inspections of undertakings and associations of undertakings to enable the Board to perform its statutory functions, including the examination of physical and electronic records and data. Article 16(1)(d) provides for an administrative fine where an inspection is hindered or obstructed. The Guideline on the Examination of Digital Data during On-Site Inspections (“Guideline”) sets out the framework for examining digital systems and storage media. Article 4 requires a preliminary review of portable communication devices to determine whether they contain undertaking data. Devices used exclusively for personal purposes are excluded from examination, while those containing undertaking data may be examined using forensic tools.

The council of state’s assessment

The Council of State recognised the need for unannounced, swift and uninterrupted inspections. It also confirmed the procedural nature of the obstruction fine, which addresses the risk of disruption to the investigative process. This did not, however, remove the limits on the material the Authority may examine. The court emphasised that Article 15 does not confer an unrestricted power to examine information and documents and that personal ownership alone does not place a device beyond the scope of an inspection, as a personal phone may contain undertaking data. However, the preliminary review is important in determining whether a device contains business-related material that can be associated with the undertaking under review and that falls within the Authority’s inspection powers.

The Council of State also considered the implications for privacy. Although undertaking data cannot be excluded from examination merely because it is stored on a personal device, examining such devices requires particular care. The Authority must explain, on the basis of its preliminary review, why the material examined constitutes undertaking data. On the facts, the court found that the Authority had not established through concrete evidence that the WhatsApp groups contained undertaking data. The correspondence obtained from another employee’s device was, instead, entirely personal and unrelated to company business. Neither the inspection record, the technical opinion nor the Board’s decision demonstrated that the device and the group examined contained undertaking data within the meaning of Article 4 of the Guideline.

The Council of State therefore found the fine unlawful and, on the grounds set out in its judgment, upheld the outcome reached by the regional administrative court. It unanimously dismissed the Authority’s appeal, rendering the judgment final.

Conclusion

The judgment draws a distinction between the deletion of material falling within the Authority’s inspection powers and the deletion of personal correspondence outside their scope. In this case, proof of deletion after the inspection began did not remedy the failure to establish that the material constituted undertaking data. The outcome reflects the finding that the recovered correspondence was deemed entirely personal, despite the business-related appearance.

The decision underscores the importance of distinguishing personal communications from business-related material and documenting that distinction during an inspection. The decision should not be read as establishing a general defence based on personal ownership of a device or the availability of messages elsewhere. It is important to underscore that the judgment does not justify deletion during an inspection. Rather, its significance lies in the requirement for the Authority to substantiate that the material it seeks to examine falls within its inspection powers.

by Onur Berke Okur, Mete Erdoğan

Turkish Competition Board clears Kars Çimento acquisition with behavioural commitments

In its decision dated 11 November 2025 and numbered 25-42/1035-591, the Board conditionally cleared Arsem Madencilik Enerji Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ’s (“Arsem”) acquisition of Kars Çimento Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ (“Kars Çimento”). Arsem is controlled by the Uçar family.

The acquisition would transfer sole control of Kars Çimento from Cementir Holding N.V. to the Uçar family. The latter already produces cement and clinker through Arkoz Madencilik Enerji Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ (“Arkoz”), which operates a plant in Ağrı, while Kars Çimento operates a plant in neighbouring Kars.

Relevant markets and competition concerns

The Board examined three product markets: grey cement, clinker and autoclaved aerated concrete. The transaction involved horizontal overlaps in grey cement and clinker, alongside vertical links between clinker and cement, and between cement and autoclaved aerated concrete.

The principal concerns arose in regional grey cement markets. The Board assessed overlapping areas within 250 km (eight provinces) and 150 km (Kars, Iğdır and Ağrı) of the parties’ plants, as well as Kars and Iğdır under its 10% consumption-coverage criterion.

In the two narrower areas, Kars Çimento and Arkoz were the largest and second-largest suppliers, with combined market shares of approximately 85–95%. Under the 150 km approach, the post-transaction Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (“HHI”) exceeded 8,600, an increase of more than 4,100 points.

The Board pointed to high transport costs, limited spare capacity, entry barriers, weak import pressure and difficulties faced by customers seeking alternative suppliers. It identified risks of both unilateral price increases and greater coordination in a concentrated and transparent market. Local customers and dealers also raised concerns about prices and supply.

Horizontal effects in clinker were considered less problematic because the parties largely used clinker internally. The Board nevertheless examined possible foreclosure of clinker supplies to rival cement producers. It found more limited risks in autoclaved aerated concrete, given Arkoz’s modest downstream presence and the availability of other suppliers.

Key behavioural commitments

Price cap. For 2026–2030, the last invoiced cement prices in December 2025 serve as the base. Each subsequent price increase must not exceed the arithmetic average of changes in the consumer price index (TÜFE) and wholesale price index (TEFE), as referred to in the decision, since the previous adjustment. Dealers must receive at least 15 days’ written notice of increases, and price and cost reports must be submitted every six months.

Capacity, supply and investment. Arsem committed to keeping capacity utilisation at the Kars plant at or above 90%, maintaining domestic cement supply at no less than Kars Çimento’s 2022–2024 average, and ensuring that production at the Kars and Arkoz plants covers annual cement consumption in Kars and Iğdır. It also undertook to make efficiency investments and implement safeguards to ensure that clinker exports do not compromise domestic supply.

Dealer and customer protection. Existing Kars Çimento dealers must retain terms no less favourable than those applicable before the transaction. The merged business must avoid restrictive exclusivity or supply arrangements and apply objective, non-discriminatory sales conditions. It may not worsen existing customers’ payment, discount or security terms in Kars, Ağrı and Iğdır.

Monitoring and compliance. Arsem must provide six-monthly implementation reports, which may be reviewed by an independent monitor appointed by the Authority at Arsem’s expense. The package also requires competition law training and compliance materials within three months, and a dedicated complaints channel within one month, with a 10-business-day response deadline.

Employment and duration. Arsem undertook to retain existing staff, subject to justified exceptions, and increase employment by 10% within three years, alongside regional development initiatives. The commitments take effect upon notification of the short-form clearance decision and remain in force for five years. The Authority will then review their effectiveness, and the price cap may be extended if necessary.

The Board’s assessment

The case handlers recommended prohibiting the transaction, considering the proposed behavioural commitments insufficient to address the competition concerns.

The Board reached a different conclusion. While structural remedies are generally preferred, it found no suitable structural remedy in this case. It considered the extensive, measurable commitments and monitoring obligations capable of addressing the identified risks.

The Board regarded the price cap, production and supply safeguards, and dealer protections as particularly relevant. It also assessed the investment and employment commitments positively.

Compliance with the commitments is mandatory. Breaches may lead to administrative fines under Article 17 of Law No. 4054.

Significance for Turkish merger control

The decision illustrates the Board’s willingness, in exceptional circumstances, to accept behavioural remedies in a horizontal transaction producing exceptionally high regional market shares.

Unlike divestitures, these commitments leave the market structure intact while placing continuing limits on the merged undertaking’s pricing, production, supply and customer relationships. The inflation-linked price cap is particularly striking, as it requires sustained regulatory oversight.

The outcome should not, however, be read as a general departure from the preference for structural remedies. The Board’s reasoning turned on the absence of a suitable structural solution and the breadth and enforceability of the package accepted in this case.

The Board’s consideration of employment and regional development also stands out, although the central competition concerns related to the loss of rivalry in regional cement markets.

by Selen Toma Karavil, Ceren Özkorkut

Preserving customers and reserving room for rivals: remedy package helps clear the CoreX/Polisan acquisition

Introduction

Through its decision dated 3 April 2026 and numbered 26-12/357-137 (“Decision”), the Board granted conditional clearance to CoreX Ports and Terminals Dilovası Liman İşletmeleri AŞ’s (“CoreX”) acquisition of a controlling stake in Polisan Holding AŞ (“Polisan”). CoreX is a special-purpose vehicle ultimately controlled by Yüksel Yıldırım.

The Decision stands out for two reasons. First, the Board found that the transaction, as notified, would significantly impede effective competition in two port services markets in the Kocaeli/Marmara region. Second, rather than a conventional divestiture, the Board accepted a commitment package combining the structural effects of a separate, pre-existing demerger among the Yıldırım family shareholders simultaneously reviewed by the Board with detailed operational and commercial commitments.

Background to the transaction

The notified transaction concerned CoreX’s acquisition of a majority stake in Polisan, which, through its subsidiary Poliport Kimya Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ (“Poliport”), operates port facilities in the Kocaeli/Marmara region handling hazardous bulk liquid chemicals, petroleum and petroleum-derivative products, among other cargo. CoreX, newly incorporated for this transaction, forms part of CoreX Holding B.V., a group controlled by Yüksel Yıldırım; Polisan separately operates in chemicals, construction chemicals, paints and real estate.

Yüksel Yıldırım, together with his brother Ali Rıza Yıldırım, jointly controls Yıldırım Holding AŞ, whose port subsidiaries include Yılport, Rota, Solventaş Teknik Depolama AŞ (“Solventaş”) and Gemport, handling containers, dry bulk and general cargo and, through Solventaş, hazardous liquid chemicals and petroleum products; Polisan’s port activities, by contrast, are carried out through Poliport alone. Critically, Solventaş already sat within the Yıldırım family’s control before the transaction, so the transaction would, for the first time, bring Solventaş and Poliport under common ultimate ownership, creating a horizontal overlap in several port services markets.

The Board’s competitive assessment

The Board’s review identified several markets of horizontal overlap, including general cargo and dry bulk port services, where the overall market structure was fragmented and the combined entity’s share remained below the 20% safe-harbour threshold under the Board’s Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions (“Horizontal Guidelines”). The position was markedly different for hazardous bulk liquid chemicals and petroleum/petroleum-derivative products port services in the Northeast Marmara region. The Board treated hazardous liquid port services as distinct from other liquid bulk services, given their dedicated regulatory regime and infrastructure, and split hazardous liquid chemicals from petroleum/petroleum-derivative products given petroleum terminals’ additional licensing regime and technical standards, which make the two non-substitutable on both demand and supply sides. Its market share analysis showed the merged entity would become the clear leader in hazardous liquid chemical handling (with a share several times that of its nearest rival and exceeding those of all other competitors combined) and would likewise rise to first place in petroleum and petroleum-derivative product handling.

An HHI analysis reinforced these findings: pre-transaction HHI levels already exceeded 2,000 in every affected market, with the transaction adding more than 150 points, within the range the Horizontal Guidelines treat as risky. The Board accordingly concluded that unconditional clearance could significantly lessen competition in these markets, and that the transaction could not proceed in its notified form.

The relevant geographic market

Particular care was given to the definition of the relevant geographic market for the hazardous liquid chemicals and petroleum/petroleum-derivative products markets. The Board assessed geographic scope by reference to the “static” component (a port’s hinterland traffic) and the “dynamic” component (its catchment area under liner-route traffic). Applying the static approach, it noted that the relevant port operators were all located in the Marmara region (itself divided into Northwest, Northeast and South Marmara), with Northeast Marmara (Sakarya, Kocaeli, Yalova and Asian Istanbul) hosting the highest concentration of ports able to handle hazardous liquid cargo.

Testing substitutability by road, the Board found that the only crossing available for hazardous liquid chemicals between the Asian and European sides of Istanbul (the Yavuz Sultan Selim bridge) carries only marginal volumes relative to Northeast Marmara’s overall traffic, so the two sub-regions could not be treated as one market. Between Northeast and South Marmara, the Osmangazi bridge cannot be used for hazardous liquid cargo at all, leaving only a roughly 234 km road route via Çelebi Bandırma (South Marmara’s sole licensed port for such cargo, used mainly for transfer rather than storage), while the route to Northwest Marmara is longer still, at roughly 458 km, with correspondingly higher transport costs.

Drawing on this analysis, and on its own precedent in the Likit Port decision dated 24 October 2024, the Board concluded that, for hazardous bulk liquid chemicals (and, by analogy, petroleum/petroleum-derivative products) port services, the relevant geographic market should be defined narrowly as Northeast Marmara, or more broadly as “North Marmara” (Northeast plus Northwest Marmara). For general cargo and dry bulk port services, consistent with precedent treating such markets regionally, the Board considered the relevant geographic market to be the broader Marmara region.

The commitments: a structural solution arising from a separate demerger

What makes the Decision particularly instructive is the remedy package submitted. Consistent with its preference for structural remedies over behavioural remedies, the Board first considered whether a structural fix was available. The Yıldırım family was separately undergoing a broader demerger dividing Yüksel and Ali Rıza Yıldırım’s jointly held businesses. As part of that process, the Board had also cleared a related transaction on the same date as the Decision, under which Solventaş would pass to Ali Rıza Yıldırım’s sole control, severing it entirely from Yüksel Yıldırım. Once that transaction closed, the horizontal overlap for the matter at hand would be eliminated automatically; the needed structural change would arise as a by-product of a separate reorganisation already in motion. Given the uncertain timing for closing (the Decision recorded expected completion by September 2026, or by year-end if delayed), Yüksel Yıldırım offered the Board a bridging package of operational and commercial commitments to preserve competitive conditions during the interim period.

The operational commitments

The operational commitments were designed to neutralise, for the interim period, any ability of Yüksel Yıldırım to control or influence Solventaş pending its transfer to Ali Rıza Yıldırım’s sole control. He would take no decision-making role in Solventaş’s management or commercial affairs, would not sit on or attend its board meetings, and would not participate in its general assembly or in appointing or instructing any proxy for his shareholding.

Yüksel Yıldırım also agreed to a comprehensive operational separation between Solventaş and Poliport (covering management, commercial decision-making, premises, staffing, equipment and IT), together with a ban on exchanging commercially sensitive information between them. The Board regarded this as effective in eliminating, legally and practically, any residual ability of Yüksel Yıldırım to influence Solventaş’s market conduct, reducing him in substance to a passive shareholder for the interim period.

The commercial commitments

Beyond the operational separation, Yüksel Yıldırım offered commercial commitments addressing concerns the Board considered could otherwise arise from the merged entity’s enhanced market position. CoreX pledged not to engage in any commercial activity (purchase, sale, trading or distribution) in the downstream markets for hazardous liquid chemicals or petroleum and petroleum-derivative products within Türkiye, preventing it from leveraging its port-side storage advantage against its own downstream customers. Poliport further undertook not to unilaterally terminate existing hazardous liquid chemical and petroleum-product customer contracts (save for customer-driven termination or default), and not to raise prices beyond what existing price-adjustment mechanisms already permitted. The Board viewed this as significant given the substantial switching costs and limited alternative capacity customers in these markets typically face, conditions that could otherwise let the merged entity extract supra-competitive terms from a captive customer base. Poliport also agreed to operate its hazardous liquid chemical and petroleum-product port services on a “common-user” basis, giving all existing and potential users, including competitors, transparent, objective and non-discriminatory access, with no preferential treatment for group companies. A further commitment addressed the labour market, with Yüksel Yıldırım agreeing not to reduce Poliport’s existing blue-collar headcount or alter employees’ contractual entitlements in the affected business lines. Finally, Yılport, another port under his control, would not commence any hazardous liquid chemical or petroleum-product handling or storage activity for the duration of the commitment period.

Monitoring and duration

The commitments are backed by a multi-layered compliance framework: public disclosure within 30 days of the clearance decision, written notification to existing customers, in-house compliance officers at both CoreX and Poliport reporting twice a year to the CoreX board, six-monthly compliance reports to the Authority, and an independent auditor (subject to Board approval) verifying compliance and reporting every six months. The commitments remain in force until completion of the transaction severing Yüksel Yıldırım’s control over Solventaş, with a backstop requiring the parties to notify the Board by 31 January 2027 if that transaction has not closed by 31 December 2026, triggering a fresh Board review.

Conclusion

The Decision illustrates a pragmatic, fact-specific approach to merger remedies: rather than requiring a bespoke divestiture, the Board recognised that a separate reorganisation already underway would itself deliver the necessary structural change, and tailored a bridging commitment package to preserve competitive conditions until it took effect. The emphasis on common-user access, price stability and labour-market protections also reflects enforcement themes featured in other recent Board decisions on access to scarce infrastructure.

For undertakings engaged in multi-stage reorganisations with overlapping notification requirements, the Decision shows how the Board may credit the structural effects of a related transaction when assessing remedies for another, provided the timing and completion of that related transaction can be made sufficiently certain through appropriately tailored interim commitments.

by Göktuğ Selvitopu, Mete Erdoğan

 

[1] As a general note, under the settlement mechanism, undertakings may resolve an investigation by acknowledging the existence and scope of an infringement, subject to the applicable procedural requirements. In return, the Board may reduce the administrative fine, allowing proceedings against the settling parties to be concluded without completing the ordinary investigation process.

[2] Preliminary Report, pp. 56–57, para. 166 and footnotes 96–97, discussing the Commission’s Teva/Copaxone case. Footnote 97 refers to the Commission statement at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_5621

[3] Preliminary Report, p. 94, para. 264 and footnotes 128–130, discussing AstraZeneca plc v Commission, Case T-321/05 (2010), and AstraZeneca v Commission, Case C-457/10 P (2012). The Commission’s underlying 2005 decision, Case COMP/A.37.507/F3, is identified at p. 59, footnote 98.

[4] Preliminary Report, p. 132, paras. 361–362, discussing the Board’s Bayer decision dated 28 July 2020 and numbered 20-36/488-214 and the Board’s Novo Nordisk decision dated 22 September 2022 and numbered 22-43/633-264. The decisions and the proposed reassessment are described here as presented in the Preliminary Report; the proposals do not themselves revoke those exemptions.

[5] Workshop, first session, Authority presentation on ATC-3 classification, active-ingredient-based market definitions and potential competition in merger reviews.

[6] The Board’s Adkoturk decision dated 23 September 2026 and numbered 26-35/988-419.

[7] The Board’s decision dated 30 April 2025 and numbered 25-17/406-187.

[8] Article 3(1)(d) of the Regulation on Active Cooperation for Detecting Cartels.

[9] The Board’s Duru Bilişim decision dated 2 December 2013 and numbered 13-67/929-391 and the Board’s Taximeter decision dated 11 March 2021 and numbered 21-13/174-75.

[10] Case C-194/14 P, AC-Treuhand AG v European Commission, 22 October 2015.

[11] The 13th Chamber of the Council of State’s decision dated 11 December 2019 and numbered E. 2015/3353, K. 2019/4244.

[12] Published in the Official Gazette dated 27 December 2024 and numbered 32765.

[13] The Board’s decision dated 14 January 2016 and numbered 16-02/44-14.

[14] The Board’s Dairy Sector decision dated 30 April 2026 and numbered 26-16/477-174. The decision is available through this link.

[15] Welch’s t-test assesses whether the averages of two groups differ statistically, without assuming equal variability within the groups. Here, it was used to compare average monthly purchases before and after the relevant dates.

[16] The Board’s FMCG retailer-supplier decision dated 15 December 2022 and numbered 22-55/863-357. The decision is available through this link.

[17] Board’s UNMAŞ decision dated 20 May 2021 and numbered 21-26/327-152: fine imposed despite forensic recovery of business-related WhatsApp messages. See also Board’s Medicana decision dated 17 June 2021 and numbered 21-31/400-202: fine imposed where a connection problem prevented forensic access to a general manager’s mobile phone.

[18] The Board’s A101 decision dated 23 June 2022 and numbered 22-28/464-187: no fine, as neither the alleged deletion nor its timing after commencement of the inspection was established. The decision nevertheless includes a comprehensive dissenting opinion, arguing that not imposing a monetary fine contradicts the Board’s prior practice.

[19] Board’s Happy Center decision dated 11 May 2023 and numbered 23-21/407-138: fine imposed for deletion of WhatsApp group correspondence from personally owned devices containing undertaking data. Board’s BALSU decision dated 17 August 2023 and numbered 23-39/727-250: no fine following recovery and examination of approximately 1,500 emails, taking account of its third-party status and lack of a concealment motive; a concurring member rejected recovery as an independent answer to obstruction. Board’s Koyuncu decision dated 21 September 2023 and numbered 23-45/839-295: fine imposed despite recovery of deleted Outlook emails, with a dissent favouring a contextual assessment.

[20] Board’s Serin Beton decision dated 3 October 2024 and numbered 24-40/955-413: fine imposed after three employees deleted WhatsApp correspondence from personally owned devices containing undertaking data; recovery was unsuccessful or incomplete.

[21] Board’s Samsung decision dated 10 April 2025 and numbered 25-14/330-157: no fine where leaving work-related groups triggered automatic deletion, correspondence was accessible elsewhere and no finding relevant to the investigation emerged; dissenting views favoured a fine. Board’s SELTAŞ decision dated 11 September 2025 and numbered 25-34/799-469: fine imposed, with screenshots obtained during a simultaneous inspection at GEMAK establishing departure from and deletion of a WhatsApp group. Board’s Duru decision dated 20 November 2025 and numbered 25-43/1059-606: fine imposed despite partial forensic recovery of deleted WhatsApp correspondence.

[22] Board’s Sahibinden decision dated 27 May 2021 and numbered 21-27/354-174.