This article examines the Turkish Competition Board’s (“Board”) Adkoturk Decision[1] (“Decision”), in which the Board, having opened a full investigation into Adkoturk Gıda San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti. (“ADKOTURK”), the producer of Indomie, imposed interim measures under Article 9(4) of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”). Until a final decision is taken, ADKOTURK may not provide retail outlets with free products, delisting budgets, activity budgets, visibility support or similar commercial advantages. The Decision defines the instant noodle market for the first time in Turkish practice and places shelf access within the line of fast-moving consumer goods (“FMCG”) cases the Board has developed since 2025.
Background
The proceedings began with a confidential complaint of 25 May 2026 alleging that ADKOTURK, holding a share above 80% for more than three years, had abused its dominance by paying retail chains under headings such as “activity budget” and “category management contribution” and by creating de facto exclusivity on the shelf. The complainant relied on the Board’s Frito Lay[2] and Unilever[3] decisions and on Hoffmann-La Roche[4] and Intel[5], and asked that at least 30% of shelf space be reserved for competitors.
The relevant market
The sector had not previously been examined in Türkiye. The Board surveyed its own pasta precedents[6], the European Commission’s Unilever/Bestfoods[7] decision and the Japan Fair Trade Commission’s Nissin/Myojo[8] decision. It then distinguished instant noodles from egg noodles by preparation, consumption purpose, portion size and price. Supply-side substitution was rejected, since the two products use different raw materials and production lines, and pasta was likewise excluded. The relevant market was defined as the instant noodle market in Türkiye.
Dominance
Relying on Nielsen data for 2024 to 2026, the Board found that ADKOTURK’s value share rose while the shares of Erişler, Oba and Unilever all declined, leaving a gap of several multiples between the leader and the second player. Numerical and weighted distribution and in-store share told the same story, and the outlets where ADKOTURK was absent accounted for a marginal share of sales volume. Because roughly 62% of sales are made through discount chains, the Board examined that channel separately and found ADKOTURK’s position there to be stronger still. First-mover advantage was treated as a reinforcing factor, ADKOTURK having entered in 2010 and built Türkiye’s first noodle plant in 2014. On buyer power, the Board accepted that retail chains such as BİM and A101 account for large portions of ADKOTURK’s sales, but considered that the weakness of rivals left retailers without a genuine alternative source of supply. ADKOTURK was found to be dominant.
The evidence
The dawn raid produced evidence spanning February 2018 to July 2026. Addressing the eight-year limitation period, the Board invoked the single and continuous infringement doctrine, holding that acts forming part of one overall plan with a single economic aim may be treated as a single infringement, so that the earliest document remained in scope.
The documents fall into three groups. The first concerns the physical removal of rivals, where internal messages record competitors’ display stands being dismantled and replaced, and instructions that “at least 80% of the shelf should be ours” and that shelves should be arranged “according to a 95% market share”. The Board considered these to be organised instructions flowing from management to the field rather than individual initiatives.
The second concerns delisting, where a 30 million TRY budget offered to a retail chain in connection with the delisting of five competitor SKUs, a chain’s own private label delisted in favour of an ADKOTURK product, and the complete delisting of a rival reported as agreed with a further chain.
The third links financial support to shelf outcomes. In that context, the Board found that free goods exchanged for additional facings, free product in return for a gondola dedicated exclusively to ADKOTURK, and an invoice bearing “visibility” in its description issued by a national chain in ADKOTURK’s name.
Rebates and personalised budgets
ADKOTURK’s agreements with retailers carry a variety of premiums, including turnover, logistics, category support and activity, applied at rates that differ from customer to customer. ADKOTURK confirmed that no uniform discount model exists and that no internal written procedure governs these arrangements. The Board treated this individualised, rather than standardised, rebate design as carrying a stronger loyalty-inducing effect. In its agreement with Metro, a national retail chain, the Board identified a target-based premium calculated on net purchase turnover, which it characterised as a retroactive loyalty mechanism. Much of the relationship is undocumented, as premium rates are agreed orally or by email rather than in the framework contracts, and this kept the Board from establishing the full scope of the schemes.
The interim measure
Article 9(4) permits interim measures where serious and irreparable harm may arise before a final decision, provided the measure preserves the position existing before the infringement and does not exceed the scope of the final decision. The Board recalled that it had once required a manifest infringement, as in Cine5[9], but has since departed from that standard, requiring instead a strong suspicion sufficient to justify the measure. It then reviewed its recent practice, citing WhatsApp[10], Trendyol[11] and Meta/Threads[12] decisions along with others. It concluded that ADKOTURK’s position, financial strength and brand recognition, combined with strong suspicion that financial advantages were used to remove rivals from the shelf, created a high risk that competitors would be prevented from reaching customers. The measure was adopted unanimously by the Board.
Comment
The Decision belongs to a recognisable and recent line of FMCG access cases the Board has built. Frito Lay came first, reserving 30% of the supplier’s own stands for competing products, physically separated and labelled[13]. Unilever/Magnum extended this to coolers, requiring 30% of each cooler in outlets of 100 m² or less to be given over to rivals as a labelled block, extendable to 50% on request[14]. Coca-Cola raised access from 25% to 35% of cooler capacity by commitments, with physical dividers, labelling and independent measurement[15]. Haribo applied the same logic to display stands, reserving 30% of the visible area in outlets of 200 m² or less[16].
These cases share three features, namely, a fixed rather than negotiated ratio, physically separated and labelled space, and compliance verified by documents rather than assurances. Thresholds track outlet size, 100 m² for coolers and 200 m² for stands, aiming at the small outlet where a single piece of furniture is the whole category. This architecture now spans an infringement decision, two interim measures and a commitment package, suggesting it has become the Board’s standard response to shelf exclusivity, whatever the procedural vehicle.
Adkoturk shares the diagnosis but reverses the prescription. The earlier cases tell a dominant supplier what it must give rivals; this measure tells it what it may not give retailers. The operative part allocates no shelf space to competitors, removing instead the currency, including free goods, delisting budgets, activity budgets and visibility support, that the Board suspects bought the space. What remains open is how this ends, since an infringement finding would force the Board to choose between the prohibition it has imposed now and the allocation template it has applied four times before.
Two points stand out. The first is evidential. The file rests on WhatsApp messages and emails from the supplier’s own sales organisation, which set shelf outcomes as percentages and discuss removing rival brands by name, and a single dawn raid supplied the documents needed to meet the Board’s strong-suspicion test. The second is the gap between the written contracts and what the parties actually did, with premium rates and budgets settled orally or by email outside the framework agreements. That gap cut both ways, since it stopped the Board from establishing the full scope of the schemes but did nothing to keep the conduct out of the file. For suppliers holding strong positions in Turkish retail, the lesson is that trade spend will be judged by what it achieves on the shelf rather than by how it is booked, and that an arrangement left out of the contract still surfaces in the messages that carry it out.
[1] Decision of the Board dated 23.09.2026 and numbered 26-35/988-419 (Adkoturk).
[2] Decision of the Board dated 13.02.2025 and numbered 25-06/152-78 (Frito Lay).
[3] Decision of the Board dated 18.03.2021 and numbered 21-15/190-80 (Unilever).
[4] Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, judgment of 13.02.1979, ECR 461.
[5] Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Commission, EU:C:2017:632.
[6] Decision of the Board dated 20.02.2003 and numbered 03-11/123-57 (Doğuş/Barilla); Decision of the Board dated 05.10.2011 and numbered 11-51/1283-449 (Yıldız/Mitsubishi/Nissin).
[7] Commission Decision of 28.09.2000, Case No COMP/M.990 (Unilever/Bestfoods).
[8] Japan Fair Trade Commission, Acquisition of Myojo Foods’ Shares by Nissin Food Products, Major Business Integrations in FY2006, 19.06.2007.
[9] Decision of the Board dated 13.08.1998 and numbered 78/601-111 (Cine5).
[10] Decision of the Board dated 11.01.2021 and numbered 21-02/25-10 (WhatsApp).
[11] Decision of the Board dated 30.09.2021 and numbered 21-46/669-334 (Trendyol).
[12] Decision of the Board dated 08.02.2024 and numbered 24-07/125-50 (Meta/Threads).
[13] Frito Lay, above note 2.
[14] Unilever, above note 3; Decision of the Board dated 22.04.2026 and numbered 26-15/434-162 (Unilever/Magnum).
[15] Decision of the Board dated 04.06.2026 and numbered 26-20/614-243 (Coca-Cola Satış ve Dağıtım).
[16] Decision of the Board dated 04.06.2026 and numbered 26-20/605-241 (Haribo).
Originally published in Concurrences
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This is for information purposes; it is not legal advice. As laws and their interpretation may change, please consult Turkish legal counsel to confirm the current position and obtain advice tailored to your circumstances before making any decision or taking action in relation to your matter in Türkiye. All rights reserved.