Turkish Competition Authority Publishes Sector Inquiry Report On Handheld Terminals

The Sector Inquiry Report on Practices Concerning Handheld Terminals and Similar Devices (the “Report”), dated December 2025, was published by the Turkish Competition Authority (“Authority”) on 13 January 2026. The Report concerns portable devices, also referred to as scanners, which collect data via barcode/RFID and enable wireless data transmission, thereby allowing digital tracking of production, warehouse, logistics and sales processes.

The Report examines in detail the structure of the fast-moving consumer goods (“FMCG”) sector and its supply processes, as well as the role of handheld terminals in this ecosystem. Handheld terminals have become widespread at every stage of the FMCG supply chain, providing real-time data flow, traceability and operational efficiency. At the same time, their data collection and price monitoring capabilities present both opportunities and risks from a competition law perspective.

1. Definition and Uses of Handheld Terminals

As stated in the Report, handheld terminals are portable devices equipped with data collection functions such as barcode/RFID, capable of transmitting data via Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or cellular networks, operating on Android, Windows or Linux-based operating systems, and distinguished by their durable construction. The devices are classified into two main types: (i) long-range durable indoor devices with a handle, used in warehouses, and (ii) pocket-sized, GSM-enabled handheld devices used in field sales.

The Report notes that handheld terminals serve a variety of purposes. In retail and in-store applications, they are used for shelf-stock and price updates; in warehouse and logistics operations, for goods receipt, order preparation and shipment tracking; and in field sales, for mobile ordering, invoicing, stock and price display, delivery confirmation and route tracking. In this way, real-time data synchronisation between headquarters and field operations is ensured.

Uses in the FMCG Sector

Within the FMCG sector, handheld terminals perform multiple functions in warehouse operations. During goods receipt, waybill and barcode/RFID matching is carried out; location guidance is provided for stock management principles such as first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO) or first-expired-first-out (FEFO); and cycle counting and traceability functions are performed. In order picking and shipment processes, verification is conducted using picking lists downloaded to the terminal, final scanning is completed during loading, and electronic waybill creation is finalised.

In field sales activities, handheld terminals are used for route management and monitoring real-time performance indicators. They also enable stock and campaign information display, hot/cold sales transactions, collection and account viewing functions, and documentation of return and deposit transactions in reverse logistics processes. Finally, batch/lot and expiry date tracking and rapid recall operations are carried out via handheld terminals in fulfilment of the obligation on food establishments to maintain systems enabling product traceability at all stages of production, processing and distribution.

2. Competition Law Context and Theoretical Framework

The Report states that handheld terminals play an important role in the digital transformation of the FMCG sector, owing to the operational capabilities they provide, their critical position in the distribution and supply chain structure, and the high efficiency they deliver in field, warehouse and retail operations. However, it is emphasised that features such as data collection, stock visibility and price monitoring give rise to both opportunities and risks from a competition law perspective.

The Report notes that particular competitive risks may arise where the infrastructure of digital systems used to manage handheld terminals is controlled by an upstream market player, while downstream undertakings act merely as users of the terminals. In such cases, infringements of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”) may arise in the form of (i) resale price maintenance (“RPM”), (ii) territory and customer allocation, and (iii) rebate systems, where competitively sensitive information such as resale prices, sales volumes, customer/point information and stock status is collected through handheld terminals. In this regard, the Report addresses, under separate headings, the theoretical competition law framework applicable to RPM and territory/customer allocation under Article 4 of Law No. 4054, and to rebate systems under Article 6 of Law No. 4054.

Handheld Terminals in Board Decisions

The Report refers to several Turkish Competition Board (“Board”) decisions in which handheld terminals were examined. It first addresses the 2007 Frito Lay Decision^[1], in which the Board examined allegations that the handheld terminal system established by Frito-Lay Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. (“Frito Lay”) with its distributors prevented distributors from freely determining their sales prices. The Board found that the system restricted distributors’ ability to set resale prices and concluded that it fell within the scope of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and could not benefit from the group exemption under the Block Exemption Communiqué No. 2002/2 on Vertical Agreements (“Communiqué No. 2002/2”). Nevertheless, the Board decided not to open an investigation but issued an opinion under Article 9(3) of Law No. 4054, stating that the handheld terminal system should be reorganised to allow distributors to set prices freely.

In the 2013 Frito Lay Decision^[2], the same handheld terminal system was re-examined. The Board established that the system allowed the application of discounts as desired, that discounting was not widespread in the traditional channel, and that distributors adopted the recommended prices. It therefore again concluded that there was no need to open an investigation.

Another decision addressed in the Report is the Gillette Decision^[3], in which the Board found that the software used in Gillette Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.’s (“Gillette”) handheld terminal enabled distributors to define discounts on their own initiative and technically allowed the addition of new customers to the customer list. As Gillette’s permission or approval was not required for these actions, the Board concluded that no investigation was necessary.

The Report also addresses the Mey İçki Decision^[4], in which the Board evaluated the request for exemption for the Distribution Agreement between Mey İçki Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. (“Mey İçki”) and Gram Gıda ve Tekel Maddeleri A.Ş. The Board examined Mey İçki’s handheld terminal system and established that distributors could change prices, carry out promotions and apply discounts through the system.

Another decision covered in the Report is the Red Bull Decision^[5], in which the Board examined allegations that Redbull Gıda Dağıtım ve Pazarlama Tic. Ltd. Şti. (“Redbull”) determined resales prices through a computer programme imposed on distributors and that discounts could not be applied without Redbull’s approval. The Board found that distributors were able to define discounts freely at their preferred rates, identified no competition concerns, and concluded that no administrative fine was required.

Finally, the Report discusses the Nestlé Decision^[6], in which the Board comprehensively examined Nestlé Türkiye Gıda Sanayi A.Ş.’s (“Nestlé”) handheld terminal system. The Board found that some distributors were subject to approval restrictions when entering prices and discounts, that price and discount rates were not approved unless they matched the rates determined by Nestlé, and that price and territory monitoring was carried out through the system, with sanctions applied in cases of non-compliance. The Board therefore concluded that Nestlé had violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and imposed an administrative fine.

As these decisions illustrate, electronic management systems integrated into handheld terminals can be designed in different ways, and the nature of these designs, as well as which undertaking controls the system, have direct and significant implications from a competition law perspective. In particular, where system infrastructure is entirely controlled by the supplier, the risk of limiting distributors’ commercial independence and distorting the competitive structure increases.

In supplier-controlled systems, distributors’ ability to freely determine resale prices may be restricted. Real-time price monitoring via handheld terminals allows suppliers to exercise de facto supervision and indirect influence over distributors’ pricing policies, potentially eliminating independent pricing freedom. Moreover, where customer management authorisations are concentrated solely with the supplier, additional competition concerns arise. Distributors’ inability to add new customers directly to the system or limitations on access to certain territories may result in de facto customer and territory restrictions, narrowing distributors’ areas of activity and adversely affecting competitive dynamics. Furthermore, these electronic management systems enable detailed monitoring of distributors’ commercial activities, allowing suppliers to identify deviations from prescribed sales policies and, where necessary, impose sanctions. Such supervision and control mechanisms limit distributors’ independent commercial decision-making and effectively compel them to act in line with supplier-determined policies.

3. Main Risks of Handheld Terminals from a Competition Perspective and Recommendations in the Report

Resale Price Maintenance

With respect to RPM risks, the Report identifies concerns arising from restricting resellers’ pricing freedom via handheld terminal systems, regular monitoring of price compliance, and suspension of supply in cases of non-compliance. According to the Report, using data obtained through handheld terminals for price monitoring or intervention purposes carries RPM risk, and supplier-imposed restrictions on resellers’ price-setting freedom through the connected system may be assessed as RPM.

The Report further notes that handheld terminal systems allow suppliers to monitor resellers’ compliance with determined sales prices on a regular basis and to exert pressure where such prices are not observed, including by stopping orders, refusing product supply or limiting supply. In such circumstances, handheld terminals may become instruments facilitating RPM infringements.

Territory and Customer Restrictions

Regarding territory and customer restrictions, the Report indicates that determining, via handheld terminal systems, which customers or territories may be served creates a risk of preventing active and passive sales under Article 4 of Law No. 4054. Emphasising that such practices may adversely affect competition at the distribution level, the Report states that, in vertical agreements providing for territorial or customer exclusivity that do not benefit from block or individual exemption, the use of handheld terminals may facilitate infringements.

Rebate Systems

Finally, the Report focuses on the risk that dominant suppliers may exclude rival firms from points of sale through the use of handheld terminals. A dominant supplier may collect data on sales prices, quantities, discounts and rebates relating to its own products at final points of sale via handheld terminals. According to the Report, collecting such information and using it in the design of rebate systems may produce anti-competitive effects through the exclusion of rival suppliers.

Solution Recommendations

The Report states that, when the above issues are considered together, it is appropriate to put forward recommendations to reduce competition risks and ensure the pro-competitive use of technology. It also notes that, in light of rapid technological developments, additional recommendations may become relevant.

In this context, the Report recommends transferring aggregated data rather than point-by-point data through masking or anonymisation methods. In terms of access authorisation, it recommends limiting access to parameters such as price, quantity, stock and territory/customer information to authorised and restricted personnel only. Regarding technology–policy integration, it recommends supporting digital systems with legally compliant data processing, reporting and warning mechanisms, noting that these elements reduce risks and enhance operational efficiency. In addition, the Report states that providing regular competition law training to field and management teams, and monitoring whether such training is effectively adopted by employees, will reduce competition law risks.

The Report also includes legislative recommendations directed at the Authority. It suggests adding clear provisions to the Guidelines on Vertical Agreements (“Vertical Guidelines”) stating that handheld terminals should be used solely for operational and logistical purposes, that resellers’ freedom to determine resale prices should not be restricted, and that sales data should not be used in a manner that restricts competition. It further recommends that the Vertical Guidelines clarify that territory and customer-based restrictions introduced via handheld terminal infrastructure may benefit from exemption only insofar as they are based on objective justifications. With respect to the Guidelines on the Assessment of Exclusionary Abusive Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (“Dominance Guidelines”), the Report recommends including explicit provisions stating that data collected via handheld terminals or similar systems may not be used by dominant undertakings to exclude competitors or create loyalty.

Finally, the Report states that, in preliminary investigation and investigation processes concerning undertakings using handheld terminals in supply operations, detailed examinations of handheld terminal systems would be highly beneficial where potential infringements of Law No. 4054 through (i) RPM, (ii) territory and customer allocation, or (iii) rebate systems are under review.

4. Conclusion

Whilst handheld terminals are strategic tools providing operational efficiency and transparency in the FMCG sector, end-to-end data flows carry risks that may lead to competition-restricting outcomes. RPM, territory/customer restrictions and exclusionary effects arising from rebate systems operated by dominant undertakings constitute the principal risk areas. According to the Report, this necessitates updating the competition law toolkit in line with digitalisation.

The Report recommends data governance, access controls, technology–compliance integration and training to reduce risks, and advocates eliminating uncertainties through clear provisions in the Vertical Guidelines and Dominance Guidelines. It is assessed that implementing these recommendations will significantly reduce uncertainties in practice.

The increasingly strict approach of the Board towards RPM in recent years highlights the paramount importance of ensuring that handheld terminal systems and de facto practices conducted through such systems fully comply with legislation. Whilst handheld terminals offer significant technological efficiency advantages, failure to clearly delineate legal boundaries may lead to competition-restricting outcomes. Undertakings should therefore establish and/or revise handheld terminal systems in light of the issues identified in the Report to avoid exposure to competition infringements involving handheld terminals.

The Report published on the Competition Authority’s website can be accessed here.

 

[1] Decision of the Board dated 11.01.2007 and numbered 07-01/12-7.

[2] Decision of the Board dated 18.07.2013 and numbered 13-46/588-258.

[3] Decision of the Board dated 20.03.2008 and numbered 08-25/261-88.

[4] Decision of the Board dated 19.09.2018 and numbered 18-33/547-270.

[5] Decision of the Board dated 19.12.2019 and numbered 19-45/767-329.

[6] Decision of the Board dated 15.02.2024 and numbered 24-08/149-61.